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RESEARCH NOTES
JURY SIMULATION: THE IMPACT OF JUDGE'S INSTRUCTIONS AND
ATTORNEY TACTICS ON DECISIONMAKING
ROBIN REED*
Much research has been undertaken to investi-
gate the methodology of the jury simulation para-
digm. Each of these studies isolated some of the
pitfalls involved in generalizing from experiments
to the real world. These studies suggested that the
method of presenting the stimulus,t with whom the
decision rests2 and the consequences of the decision
3
may all have a significant effect on the outcome of
the laboratory experiment.
One possible criticism of most laboratory studies
is the, failure to include judicial instructions. After
jury selection has taken place, jurors take an oath.
In this oath they promise to do two things: 1) to
decide the case solely on the facts as developed
from the evidence and 2) to uphold the law as it is
* Assistant Director, Albert P. Brewer Developmental
Center; Ph.D. Florida State University, 1976; M.A. Uni-
versity of Miami, Florida, 1970; B.A. Jacksonville Uni-
versity, 1967.
1 See Bermant, McGuire, McKinley & Salo, The Logic
of Simulation in Jury Research, 1 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAVIOR
224 (1974); Dipboye, The Effectiveness of One-Sided and
Two-Sided Appeals as a Function of Familiarization and Context,
102 J. Soc. PSYCH. 125 (1977); Walker, Thibaut & An-
dreoli, Order of Presentation at Trial, 82 YALE L.J. 216
(1972); J. Kessler, Techniques of Jury Research (April
1974) (paper presented at the Central States Speech
Convention).
2 See Bray & Noble, Authoritarianism and Decisions of Mock
Juries: Evidence of Juy Bias and Group Polarization, 36 J.
PERSONAL & Soc. PsYcH. 1424 (1978); Cornish & Sealy,
Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 208;
James, Status and Competence of Jurors, 64 AM. J. Soc. 563
(1959); Mitchell & Byrne, The Defendant's Dilemma: Effects
of Juror's Attitudes and Authoritarianism on Judicial Decisions,
25 J. PERSONAL & SOC. PSYCH. 123 (1973); Reed & Reed,
Liberalism-Conservatism as an Indicator of Jury Product and
Process, 1 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 81 (1977); Simon &
Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof, 5 LAW & Soc. REv.
319 (1971); Strodtbeck, Social Status injury Deliberations,
22 AM. Soc. REv. 713 (1957); R. Forston, The Decision-
Making Process in the American Civil Jury: A Compar-
ative Methodological Investigation (1972) (Ph.D. disser-
tation, University of Minnesota).
3 See Kerr, Severity of Prescribed Penalty and Mock Juror's
Verdicts, 36 J. PERSONAL & SOC. PSYCH. 1431 (1978);
Wilson & Donnerstein, Guilty or Not Guilty? A Look at the
SimulatedJuy Paradigm, 7 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 175 (1977).
given to them by the court. The stimulus for most
laboratory experiments, however, has been some
sort of presentation of the facts with judicial in-
structions omitted. In a 'real trial the judicial in-
structions are never optional.
Judicial instructions often provide specific guide-
lines as to how jurors are supposed to respond to
some of the typical independent variable manipu-
lations that are found in laboratory simulations.
For instance, in regard to the extraevidential factor
of the judge's personality or demeanor, the follow-
ingjudicial caution is often given:
Nothing I have said in these instructions-or done
at any other time during this trial-is any intimation
whatever as to what verdict I think you should find.
The verdict is the sole and exclusive duty and solemn
responsibility of you, the jury, and neither the Court
nor anyone else can help you in performing that
duty.
4
Similarly, there are judicial instructions on such
matters as sympathy for or against the defendant
or the state, how to determine credibility of wit-
nesses, how to respond to prior record of a defend-
ant or confessions, and on many other evidential
and extraevidential factors. This is not to say that
jurors always follow these instructions; however,
the small number of studies that have manipulated
judicial instructions indicate that juries do pay
attention to them.5 Therefore, it would seem un-
4 These instructions were taken from the pattern judi-
cial instructions of the state of Florida. SUPREME COURT
COMM. ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL
CASES, FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMI-
NAL CASES § 2.16, at 47 (1970).
o See Cornish & Sealy, note 2 supra; Forston, Judge's
Instructions: A Quantitative Analysis of Juror's Listening Com-
prehension, 18 TODAY'S SPEECH 34 (1970); Gerbasi, Zuck-
erman, Miron & Reis, Justice Needs a New Blindfold: A
Review of Mock Jury Research, 84 PSYCH. BULL. 323 (1977);
Mitchell & Byrne, note 2 supra; Simon, Juror's Evaluation
of Expert Psychiatric Testimony, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 75 (1960);
Sue, Smith & Caldwell, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on
the Decisions of Simulated Jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 3 J.
APPLIED PSYCH. 345 (1973).
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wise to use an experimental manipulation without
the standard judicial instruction that accompanies
such an occurrence in a real trial.
In the studies reported to date, only one judicial
instruction has been manipulated. No study has
yet reported an investigation of judicial instruc-
tions taken as a whole. Such a work should include
the standard instructions on the juror's role and
the definition of reasonable doubt, as well as the
instructions that are specific to a particular trial.
In the present investigation, judge's instructions,
taken as a whole, were one independent variable.
The case used in the experiment was taken from
a field study that included observations of criminal
trials and interviews with attorneys and jurors.
While several of the field study cases might have
been selected, the one chosen was of particular
interest because it ended in a mistrial. This meant
that it probably would be tried again and that the
results of an experimental study might have ap-
plied value for this specific case.
In all cases witnesses are not allowed in the
courtroom during the testimony of other witnesses
nor are they allowed to discuss their testimony with
each other. In this case the prosecuting attorney
pressed witnesses for details which, though seem-
ingly minor, could be used to impeach the testi-
mony of others. The pressure of this impeachment
attack by the prosecutor probably contributed to
the eventual mistrial. The mistrial was declared
because defense witnesses were overheard discuss-
ing their testimony with each other during the
trial.
After the mistrial was declared, it seemed ques-
tionable that the impeachment strategy was nec-
essary for a conviction. Several of the jurors inter-
viewed after the mistrial stated that they were
ready to vote guilty. The prosecutor expressed the
opinion that the impeachment had been necessary
because of the low incrimination value of the facts
alone. From these discussions an experiment was
designed to explore systematically the influence of
three variables in the case on the rate of conviction.
The three variables were judge's instructions, level
of incrimination and use of impeachment strategy.
It was predicted that the presence or absence of
judge's instructions would significantly affect the
verdict. It was further predicted that high levels of
incrimination and use of impeachment tactics
would produce more convictions. An interaction
between these two variables was also predicted, the
expectation being that the use of impeachment
would have a greater effect on the conviction rate
in the low incrimination situation. It was predicted
that jurors would pay more attention to such a
strategy in looking for additional information on
which to base their verdict. A similar prediction of
interaction between judge's instructions and level
of incrimination was also made. It was thought
thatjurors in the low incrimination situation would
be affected more by judge's instructions than those
in the high incrimination situation because those
jurors would be looking to extraevidential factors
for additional information on which to base their
verdicts.
METHOD
Subjects. The subjects were 217 male and female
students enrolled in five introductory level sociol-
ogy courses in a regional university in the Deep
South. On the day of the experiment, to avoid the
possibility of small group effects, the students were
brought to a central auditorium. One male left
before the experiment began and two female sub-
jects returned blank verdicts; thus the number of
subjects was reduced to 214.
Design. The three independent variables each
had two levels yielding a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design
resulting in eight versions of the trial stimulus. The
variable of judge's instructions and the use of
impeachment strategy were presence or absence
manipulations. The incrimination variable con-
sisted of a high and a low incrimination version of
the facts.
Stimulus Materials. The case was a criminal case
in which three individuals had been charged with
breaking and entering and possession of more than
five grams of marijuana. One of the defendants
pleaded guilty and appeared as a witness for the
prosecution. The other defendants were tried sep-
arately. The first trial ended in the mistrial de-
scribed above. The facts from this case were used
as the low incrimination version of the trial. The
facts from the second defendant's trial, which re-
sulted in conviction, were used for the high incrim-
ination version. Pilot work on scaling the incrimi-
nation variable indicated that the testimony of two
prosecution rebuttal witnesses in the second trial
made a significant difference in conviction rates.
The testimony of these two witnesses represented
the only difference between the high and low in-
crimination versions. The stimuli for judicial in-
structions included the judge's opening remarks
and instructions as they appeared in the trial tran-
script and the pattern judicial instructions. The
impeachment variable consisted of four attempts
by the prosecutor to discredit defense witness tes-
timony on the basis of conflicts between or within
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sworn statements or by attacking the character of
the witness.
PROCEDURE
When the subjects were seated in the audito-
rium, the experimenter read them the instructions.
The nature of the study was explained, the ano-
nymity of responses was assured and the subjects
were asked to indicate whether they had any prior
knowledge of the study. A promise of debriefing
was made, and the subjects were asked not to
discuss the case until after the debriefing.
The experimenter then passed out booklets con-
taining one of the eight versions of the trial. The
instructions in the booklet contained a caution not
to communicate visual or auditory reactions to the
materials. The subjects were told that they could
leave after they recorded their verdicts. At the end
of the school quarter a written description and
explanation of the purpose and results of the study
was handed out by the instructors to those classes
that had participated.
RESULTS
Since the experiment was conducted in two large
groups, preliminary analysis was done on the two
sets of data. This preliminary analysis revealed no
significant differences between the two groups, so
the data were combined for all subsequent analy-
ses.
The dependent variable of final juror verdict
was used as a measure of the effects of the three
independent variables. Table I shows the frequen-
cies of guilty, not guilty and cannot decide verdicts
in each condition. The frequencies of this table
were analyzed with a multiple contingency analy-
sis6 and the resultant chi-square values are given.
The resulting frequencies of guilty, not guilty
and cannot decide verdicts were distributed in a
significantly different pattern across the eight ex-
perimental conditions (chi-square = 36.43, df =
14, p <.01). The results displayed in Table I indi-
cate that the main effects of level of incrimination
and judge's instructions were also significant (chi-
square = 15.94, df = 2, p <.01 and chi-square =
13.55, df = 2, p <.01, respectively). However, the
prediction of a significant main effect for the im-
peachment strategy was not found. The predicted
interactions between level of incrimination and
6 See Sutcliffe, A General Method of Analysis of Frequency
Data for Multiple Classification Designs, 54 PsYcH. BULL. 134
(1957). See also N. WINER, STATISTICAL PRINCIPLES IN
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN (1971).
impeachment (AB) and level of incrimination and
judge's instructions (AC) also were unrealized.
In the conditions in which judge's instructions
were included, subjects who voted cannot decide
were given further instructions urging a verdict. Of
these verdicts, 70% were changed as a result of an
additional paragraph of instructions. Of these
changed verdicts, 43% changed to guilty and 57%
to not guilty. An examination of the changed
verdicts by level of incrimination and use of im-
peachment revealed no differences caused by ex-
perimental conditions. It should be noted, however,
that cannot decide as a final verdict was more than
twice as frequent in the noninstructed conditions.
An examination of subject variables in the ex-
periment revealed that age was significantly related
to verdict pattern (chi-square = 4.13, df = 1, p
<.05), but sex, class standing and occupation were
not significant. College major was found to be
distributed unequally among conditions and could
not be further analyzed. On the age variable,
voting patterns were similar among "college age"
students (seventeen to twenty-one) and the older
students (thirty and above). There was, however,
a transitional group between younger and older
students (twenty-two to twenty-nine) who were
more lenient in their verdicts. An analysis of the
occupation listing given by the transitional age
group revealed that a majority of these students
gave no occupation, listing themselves as full-time
students. On the other hand, those students in the
oldest age bracket (thirty and above) listed some
occupation in most cases.
DISCUSSION
The significant main effects were level of incrim-
ination and judge's instructions. Since level of in-
crimination was scaled during pilot work into two
different low and high incrimination versions of
the facts, it would seem that this finding needs
little comment. However, the difference between
the two versions does have some interesting applied
implications. Pilot work had shown that the testi-
mony of two rebuttal witnesses that was developed
after the mistrial and used in the trial of the
codefendant changed the evidence from the value
of low to high incrimination. Other results of the
pilot work suggested that the rebuttal witnesses
were even more important than an eyewitness who
had seen the defendants near the crime area at the
time it was committed. Therefore, the rebuttal
witnesses were the only difference between the high
and low incrimination versions.
The laws of full discovery in the state in which
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TABLE I
NUMBER OF CONVICTIONS AND NONCONVICTIONS BY EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS (N = 214)
Not Cannot
Condition Guilty Guilty Decide
High Incrimination
With Impeachment With
Instructions 17 10 1
Without
Instructions 21 4 4
Without With
Impeachment Instructions 18 7 3
Without
Instructions 15 5 6
Low Incrimination
With Impeachment With
Instructions 11 15 1
Without
Instructions 14 10 3
Without With
Impeachment Instructions 6 18 1
Without





Effect of Incrimination (A) 15.94* 2
Effect of Impeachment (B) 2.71 2







this trial took place mandate that all potential
witnesses' names be made available to the opposing
side. In addition, the opposing attorney has the
right to take a sworn deposition from each witness,
thus permitting him to learn the substance of each
witness' testimony. With a well-taken deposition,
an attorney can prepare an effective rebuttal in
advance. The results of this experiment suggest
that attention to rebuttal testimony may be an
important preparation area for the attorney.
The experimental manipulation of impeach-
ment did not produce a significant effect. It may
be that this variable lost some of its impact in the
written version of the trial. Some of the impact of
impeachment is achieved by seeing the expression
of the witness when a conflict in his or her testi-
mony is introduced. On the other hand, some
witnesses are well controlled and have ready expla-
nations for inconsistencies. A second possible reason
for the failure to find the predicted effect may be
the juror's expectation that the attorney will find
discrepancies. Due to the media, this may have
become part of the attorney-role expectation, and
thus jurors would not be easily swayed.
The final variable, judge's instructions, had a
significant effect. The result of this presence-ab-
sence manipulation may be the major finding of
the experiment. Jurors were affected by judge's
instructions. Jurors without instructions were more
likely to vote guilty or cannot decide. It appears
that the instructions moved individuals from in-
decision or conviction to more lenient voting.
While it is difficult in a particular case to predict
the direction of the overall impact of a set of
1980] JURY SIMULATION
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instructions, some instructions may help the case
and others may hurt it. Prior to the reading of the
instructions to the jury, the judge usually holds a
conference with the attorneys to discuss what in-
structions will be given. Often attorneys will go on
the record as objecting to certain instructions.
These attempts to suppress certain instructions in-
dicate that attorneys recognize the possible imlact
ofjudicial instructions on the final verdict.
The study of the impact of extralegal factors
such as physical characteristics of participants,
7
personality or character,3juror attitudes9 and other
situational variables' ° has become a popular re-
search area in social psychology. The law has long
recognized that these nonevidential factors could
influence a juror's verdict. The judge's instructions
were developed in part to counteract these influ-
ences. The results of the present study support the
conclusion that judicial instructions should be in-
cluded in experimental investigations of the jury
process.
Further evidence for this conclusion was the
large percentage of subjects (70%) in the instructed
conditions who changed from a verdict of cannot
decide to either guilty or not guilty when addi-
tional instructions were given to them. The instnuc-
tion that was used has been referred to as the
"dynamite charge." A judge may use it when it
appears that a jury is deadlocked. While it might
be suggested that the demand characteristics" of
this extra instruction were responsible for this
change, it is also possible that similar demand
characteristics exist in the courtroom when the
judge instructs the jurors. In that case, the juror
7 See Sigall & Ostrove, Beautiful but Dangerous: Effects of
Offender Attractiveness and Nature of the Crime on Juridic
Judgment, 31 J. PERSONAL & Soc. PSYCH. 410 (1975).
8 See Kaplan & Kemmerick,JurorJudgment as Information
Integration: Combining Evidential and Non-Evidential Informa-
tion, 30 J. PERSONAL & Soc. PSYCH. 493 (1974); Landy &
Aronson, The Influence of the Character of the Criminal and
His Victim on the Decisions of Simulated Juries, 5 J. ExPERI-
MENTAL Soc. PSYCH. 141 (1969).
9 See Mitchell & Byrne, note 2 supra.
1o See Dejong & Hastorf, Effect of an Accomplice on the
Punishment Assigned to a Criminal Defendant, 33 J. PERSONAL
& Soc. PSYCH. 271 (1974); Sue, Smith & Caldwell, note
5 sufra; Wilson & Donnerstein, note 3 supra.
1 See Orne, Demand Characteristics and the Concept of
Quasi-controls, in ARTIFACT IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH (Ros-
now ed. 1969).
would be changing his vote to behave as a good
juror, rather than changing because of a new eval-
uation of the evidence. This study along with other
studies that have manipulated instructions indi-
cates that this phase of the trial should be incor-
porated into a simulation in order to obtain func-
tional equivalence with a real trial.
The predicted interactions of level of incrimi-
nation and judicial instructions with the impeach-
ment variable were not found. Impeachment pro-
duced effects in the same direction and approxi-
mately the same magnitude across the two levels of
each of the variables. This suggests that impeach-
ment changed a small but approximately equal
number of votes in the low and high incrimination
situations. A cost-benefit analysis suggests that in
the high incrimination situation, where an attorney
has a good chance of winning, the risks of impeach-
ment may outweigh the benefits. In the low incrim-
ination situation, where there is a low probability
of winning the case, impeachment might be worth
the risks.
The failure to find significant relationships be-
tween subject variables with the exception of age
and type of verdict is probably best explained by
the homogeneity of the sample. Where other re-
searchers have found background characteristics,
such as occupation, to be related to verdict, the
students in this sample were not representative of
the ranges of those characteristics that would be
found in the usual venire list.
One final interesting result should be noted. In
trials involving drugs it is common for prosecuting
attorneys to use peremptory challenges to remove
younger prospective jurors from the panel. The
results of this experiment with its collegiate subject
pool suggest that there are substantial numbers of
college students who voted for a conviction in a
simulation trial involving drug charges. It might
be concluded that automatic exclusion of all young
persons in a drug case is unwarranted. College
students who have been found to be "good" sub-
jects in cooperating with the instructions of the
experimenter in the laboratory may also be "good"
jurors in following the instructions that they receive
about the law in the courtroom. This is where
comparative studies of homogeneous groups of sub-
jects might be helpful to attorneys in the jury-
selection process.
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